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The international position of Italy after World War II was shaped by the Cold
War. Although Italy joined with the United States and Great Britain during
World War II after the fall of Benito Mussolini, the country was never fully
orthodox in its behavior. Italy’s adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) was never in serious doubt, but large sectors of the popula-
tion and a significant segment of the political elite disapproved of the alliance
between Rome and Washington. In Italy, the battle between Communism
and capitalism was not only an international matter but also a deeply divisive
internal issue. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) was the largest Commu-
nist party in Western Europe; it was also a young party, having grown from
roughly 6,000 members in 1943 to almost 2 million by 1946. Accompany-
ing the swelling ranks of the PCI was a powerful cultural force—one might
even call it a subculture—that extended to artists and intellectuals, to various
towns and villages, and to the country’s largest trade union confederation.1
Furthermore, as a member of the anti-Fascist alliance, the PCI cooperated
with other parties in several governments of national unity (1943–1947), in
the establishment of the Republic of Italy (1946), and in the writing of the
new constitution, which was agreed upon in 1947 and came into force on
1. Antonio Gramsci, one of the co-founders of the PCI (January 1921) and one of the most innovative
Marxist political thinkers of 20th-century Europe, worked out a theory concentrating on conquering
“culture” and not just the means of production—but without abandoning that seemingly supremely
effective political instrument, the charismatic party. Gramsci was not just a theorist, however. He com-
bined the roles of innovative intellectual and leader of a mass party. He died in 1937 in a Fascist prison
hospital in Rome, but he posthumously exerted a significant influence through his Prison Notebooks
(first published from 1948 to 1951) on both Communist and Italian postwar cultural and intellectual
history. The literature on this subject is huge. Among recent works, see Francesca Chiarotto, Oper-
azione Gramsci: Alla conquista degli intellettuali nell’Italia del dopoguerra (Milan: Bruno Mondadori,
2011); Richard Drake, Apostles and Agitators: Italy’s Marxist Revolutionary Tradition (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 206–209; and Richard Bellamy, Modern Italian Social The-
ory: Ideology and Politics from Pareto to the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987),
pp. 115–140.
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1 January 1948. Communists were a legitimate component of the country’s
post-1945 political space. In most of Western Europe, as well as the United
States, the Cold War was a conflict often in search of enemies within. By
contrast, in postwar Italy internal political rivalries that predated the Truman
Doctrine were superimposed on the debate surrounding the country’s foreign
policy.
The history of the Cold War in Italy has, for the most part, been the pre-
serve of diplomatic historians and scholars of international relations.2 From
the early 1970s, most interpretations were profoundly shaped by the U.S. re-
visionist school.3 Over time, however, more complex and nuanced evaluations
were formulated. In today’s scholarly literature, the role of Italian political
parties in the Cold War and the connection between domestic politics and in-
ternational affairs are taken quite seriously. Many works have emphasized the
interaction between U.S. policies and U.S.-style consumerism and the sub-
sequent reaction generated in Italian politics, economy, culture, and society.4
Because of the many archival sources that became available after the fall of the
end of the Cold War, the relationship between Italian Communism and Soviet
foreign policy has become a popular topic.5 Moreover, Italian historians have
2. For an overview, see Antonio Varsori, “Cold War History in Italy,” Cold War History, Vol. 8, No. 2
(May 2008), pp. 157–187.
3. For the approaches to the study of the Cold War, see Odd Arne Westad, ed., Reviewing the Cold War:
Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London, UK: Routledge, 2000). See also Odd Arne Westad, “The
Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century,” in Melvin P. Leffler and Odd Arne
Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1: Origins (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), pp. 1–19. For key accounts of the various interpretive positions, see the bibliographical
essay by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad in Leffler and Westad, eds., Origins, pp. 508–551.
A valuable survey of much of the historiography on the Marshall Plan, rightly understood to be a
centerpiece of the early Cold War, is Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “The Tragedy of the
American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1
(Winter 2005), pp. 97–134.
4. The current literature on Americanization—usually considered the major factor in Italy’s trans-
formation after World Word II—is immense. Far from being a passive recipient of U.S. proposals,
however, the Italian government often solicited them and adopted only the elements that best suited
the interests of Italian society. See the special issue on “Italy and the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Summer 2002); and Paolo Scrivano, “Sign of Americanization in Italian Do-
mestic Life: Italy’s Postwar Conversion to Consumerism,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40,
No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 317–340.
5. Recent studies have broken new ground in revealing the willingness of Iosif Stalin to sacrifice the in-
terests of the PCI to Soviet foreign interests. See, in particular, Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky,
Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origin of the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2011). On the influence of Stalinism within the Italian left, see Victor Zaslavsky, Lo stalinismo e la
sinistra italiana: Dal mito dell’Urss alla fine del comunismo, 1945–1991 (Milan: Mondadori, 2004).
More sympathetic viewers see the PCI as relatively autonomous from Moscow and firmly commit-
ted to a less threatening but not always clear national road to socialism. See, for example, Donald
Sassoon, The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party: From the Resistance to the Historic Compromise
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become increasingly interested in two issues of obvious relevance to Italy’s ex-
perience during the Cold War: the role played by international organizations
such as the United Nations (UN) and the process of European integration.6
Without denying the critical role elites played in shaping the Cold War,
this article seeks to reinforce and consolidate the Cold War “home front” as
a scholarly subfield. This means examining the conflict from the bottom up
rather than the top down. I am not, of course, the first to analyze the Cold War
by focusing on the home front. Over the past 35 years, a plethora of mono-
graphs have concentrated on U.S. society during the early Cold War years.7
However, across the Atlantic most scholars—in particular, those not focus-
ing on the German Democratic Republic—have paid little attention to the
home front.8 This article shifts the focus of attention away from governments
and diplomacy toward society and culture as agents of historical change. To
that end, it explores the psychological, rhetorical, and symbolic dimensions
of the Cold War.9 In postwar Europe, the nature of the contest between East
and West and the communications revolution of the twentieth century made
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981). Other scholars—mainly but not exclusively post-Communist—
have depicted a more uncertain strategy that was conditioned by circumstances. In this vein, Italian
Communists were able to influence and, at times and within narrow boundaries, even disregard fun-
damental aspect of Stalin’s policy. See, for example, Silvio Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of
the Cold War in Europe,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 3–27.
6. Antonio Varsori, ed., Alle origini del presente: L’Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta
(Milan: Mondadori, 2011); Pietro Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds., Atlantismo ed europeismo
(Soveria Mannelli, Italy: Rubettino, 2003); and Luciano Tosi, ed., L’Italia e le organizzazioni inter-
nazionali: Diplomazia multilaterale nel Novecento (Padua: CEDAM, 2003).
7. See, for instance, Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era, 20th
anniversary ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
8. Compared to the literature on prewar Stalinism, the paucity of studies of everyday life in the Cold
War–era Soviet Union is noticeable. On the former, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Or-
dinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999); and Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995). On the latter, the exceptions are Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!
Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000),
though his primary focus is on the earlier years; and Elena Yu. Zubkova, Russia After the War: Hopes,
Disillusionment and Disappointment, 1945–1957, trans. and ed. by Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk, NY: M.
E. Sharpe, 1998). On the German Democratic Republic (GDR), see Katherine Pence and Paul Betts,
eds., Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 2008); and Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., Dictatorship as Experience: Toward a Socio-Cultural History
of the GDR (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999).
9. On the cultural approach to the Cold War, see Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, “East Is East and
West Is West? Towards a Comparative Socio-cultural History of the Cold War,” Cold War History, Vol.
4, No. 1 (October 2003), pp. 1–22; Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, “Culture,” in Saki Dockrill and
Geraint Hughes, eds., Palgrave Advances in Cold War History (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006), pp. 240–262; Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997); Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, eds., The Cultural
Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960 (London: Frank Cass, 2003); and Jessica C. E. Gienow-
Hect, “Culture and the Cold War in Europe,” in Leffler and Westad, eds., Origins, pp. 398–419. A
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words and images formidable weapons in the battle to win the “hearts and
minds” of people. Rhetoric and symbols—in addition to the self-perception of
the combatants themselves—were crucial and not incidental means through
which the Cold War was waged.10
The role of the home front in shaping the popular political imagination
has been addressed in the historiography, but it is a story worth reexamining.11
The received narrative has elaborated on paradigms such as the coexistence of
the “American dream” and “Soviet myth,” or Italy as the most “Americanized”
country of Europe. An attraction to Moscow and the counteridealization of
the United States have caused scholars to overstate the “craving” for “non-
Italian models,” which have been portrayed as a dominant motif in Cold
War Italy.12 This article puts forth a parallel narrative. It downplays—without
neglecting—Cold War international dichotomies and instead places the pri-
mary focus on the battle between Italian Communists and anti-Communists
as an indigenous struggle for the redefinition of national, political, and indi-
vidual identity that drew from tropes and symbols found in religious tales,
ancient myths and legends, communal and family traditions, national (and
sometimes regional and local) imagery and cultural forms, long-term struc-
tures of culture and mentality, and the transformative experience of World
War II. The analysis is supported by a variety of historical sources but pri-
marily by posters, cinema, and audiovisual materials. Visual images played a
fundamental role in postwar Italy. The level of literacy in the country was rel-
atively low compared to the rest of Western Europe. In addition, Italians had
a strong visual tradition stemming from the Catholic Church’s centuries-long
practice of using artistic forms for persuasive ends. Furthermore, almost ev-
ery Italian peasant hut had its own santino (literally, “little saint” or “icon”),
as did many an urban dwelling.13 Finally, the widespread use of posters in
cultural turn has recently been advocated by some practitioners of diplomatic history. See Thomas W.
Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” Journal of American History, Vol.
95, No. 4 (March 2009), pp. 1053–1073.
10. Martin J. Medhurst, ed., Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor and Ideology (Lansing, MI: Michi-
gan State University Press, 1997).
11. Stephen Gundle, Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of
Mass Culture, 1943–1991 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Christopher Duggan and
Christopher Wagstaff, eds., Italy in the Cold War (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1995); Pier Paolo D’Attorre, ed.,
Nemici per la pelle: Sogno americano e mito sovietico nell’Italia contemporanea (Milan: Franco Angeli,
1991); and David Forgacs and Stephen Gundle, Mass Culture and Italian Society from Fascism to the
Cold War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007).
12. Christopher Duggan, “Italy in the Cold War Years and the Legacy of Fascism,” in Duggan and
Wagstaff, eds., Italy in the Cold War, p. 10.
13. On this, see the fascinating Marino Niola, I santi patroni (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007).
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the first postwar electoral campaigns can be related to the outdoor nature of
much of recreational life in Italy: the ritual of the passeggiata alone justifies
the parties’ investment in this form of communication. However, the analysis
here does not dwell exclusively on official representations; instead, it connects
them with the political and social history of the period and with the con-
ditions under which images and myths acquired power and potential at the
popular level.14 Images mean nothing in themselves, taken in isolation from
the historical and cultural context. They acquire meaning only when seen
from the standpoint of social contextualization, or with a “period eye,” to use
Michael Baxandall’s phrase.15 This is also important analytically, affecting the
mechanism by which the reservoir of tropes and cultural influences becomes
relevant. Thus, to explore the (contradictory) ways Communism was popu-
larly imagined—or how viewers apprehended images in relation to past and
current experiences—I draw here on local studies and oral history as well as
newspapers and official documents, and I examine memories and biographi-
cal and autobiographical material, which can clarify what ordinary people and
elites thought (or remembered) about the development of the Italian polity as
the events were unfolding (or afterward).16 The aim of the article is to map the
principal coordinates of the cultural system of Cold War Italy, to show how
propaganda shaped the mentality of Italians (the legacy is present even today)
and, in turn, how political representations were shaped by popular attitudes
and assumptions.
14. For the methodological background, see Victoria E. Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political
Posters under Lenin and Stalin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Lynn Hunt, Politics,
Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); and Clif-
ford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of
Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3–30.
15. Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History
of Pictorial Style (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1972), pt. 2. See also Clifford Geertz, “Art as
a Cultural System,” MLN: Modern Language Notes, Vol. 91, No. 6 (December 1976), pp. 1473–1499.
Other studies in art history that have influenced the presentation of the material in this article are
Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of Renaissance (New York: Harper
and Row, 1962); and Ernest H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial
Representation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
16. In the decade after World War II, the Italian Communist Party required its militants to narrate
their autobiographies publicly and write them out. This practice was imported from the USSR, with
roots that stretched back to the October Revolution. I have been working on more than 1,200 au-
tobiographies written by Communists from Bologna, as well as autobiographies written by militants
from Savona (Liguria), Turin, and Rome. See also Mauro Boarelli, La fabbrica del passato: Autobiografie
di militanti comunisti 1945–1956 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2007). On the practice of autobiography in the
Soviet Union, see Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Prac-
tices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); and Igal Halfin, Terror in My Soul: Communist
Autobiographies on Trial (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
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Embedded in the narrative are a series of assumptions and questions that
could be useful to scholars examining the intersection of culture and poli-
tics. This analysis can thus provide future scholars with a more sophisticated
interpretative framework to explain the Cold War from a transnational per-
spective. Although it is premature to generalize from the Italian example, this
article demonstrates—at least as far as Italy is concerned—that the Cold War
involved the search for order. Instead of representing a struggle for material
goods or economic gain, for political influence or military ascendancy, the
Cold War was a symbolic contest expressing the desire to reformulate the ap-
propriate relationship between the individual and society—a relationship that
required a high level of modification insofar as the earlier understanding had
been irreparably shattered by the experience of World War II.
The Communist as Enemy
The elections of 18 April 1948 marked a watershed in Italian history. The
Christian Democratic Party (DC) gained a sweeping victory over the Popular
Front—a coalition composed of Communists, Socialists, and other leftwing
minority parties—and remained an enduring feature of Italy’s national gov-
ernment until 1994. These elections were also a turning point in the devel-
opment of the U.S. government’s Cold War strategy. Although Italy ranked
quite low on the list of pressing issues facing U.S. policymakers at the end of
1946, two years later the Italian experience became an important blueprint for
Washington, instructive of how Communism could be defeated in Europe.17
During Italy’s 1948 election campaign, three U.S. National Security Council
analyses of the Italian situation encouraged an all-out campaign—involving
propaganda, psychological warfare, and covert operations—to prevent the
PCI from coming to power.18 The possibility of a Communist electoral
17. Morris Janowitz and Elizabeth Marwick, “U.S. Propaganda Efforts and the 1948 Italians Elec-
tions,” in William E. Daugherty, ed., in collaboration with Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare
Casebook (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1958), pp. 320–325. Scott Lucas and Kaeten
Mistry, “Illusions of Coherence: George F. Kennan, U.S. Strategy and Political Warfare in the Early
Cold War, 1946–1950,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 39–66, demonstrate
how the response to the psychological challenge posed by Italian Communism relied on an improvised
and disorganized relationship between the U.S. embassy and local politicians. This lack of strategic
coherence persisted in U.S. foreign policy during the early Cold War.
18. NSC 1/1, 14 November 1947, in Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri
[HSTL], President’s Secretary Files, Subject File, National Council Security Meeting, Box 176; NSC
1/2, 10 February 1948, in HSTL, President’s Secretary Files, Subject File, National Council Security
Meeting, Box 176; and NSC 1/3, 8 March 1948, in HSTL, President’s Secretary Files, Subject File,
National Council Security Meeting, Box 176.
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victory was anything but remote. Although the DC gained the largest num-
ber of seats in the Constituent Assembly election of June 1946, the com-
bined votes of the Communists and Socialists exceeded the DC’s total. In
addition, the PCI and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) ran on a joint ticket in
local elections and continued to outperform the DC throughout 1946 and
1947. A continuing wave of labor unrest, coupled with the emergence of
a well-organized grassroots movement inspired by the PCI, caused the U.S.
authorities a great deal of consternation. George Kennan argued in a con-
fidential memorandum written a month before the elections that it might
be advisable to outlaw the PCI to prevent a Communist takeover.19 By late
March, however, concern seemed to have eroded as reports from consulates
throughout Italy became notably more buoyant regarding the prospect of a
PCI defeat.20 U.S. policymakers believed their efforts to undermine the PCI
had worked well. In reality, they overstated both the likelihood of a legal Com-
munist accession to power and the role of the United States in defeating the
PCI. Scholars have convincingly demonstrated the limited impact of exter-
nal forces in determining the electoral outcome in Italy. Most likely, the U.S.
maneuvers would have been ineffective without the DC’s skillful exploitation
of the Communist issue and the vigorous efforts of the Vatican and grass-
roots Italian-American organizations.21 Although working in tandem with
the U.S. administration, both the Vatican and the DC pursued an all-out
effort to defeat the PCI for their own reasons—which would have existed
19. Acknowledging that this would likely provoke a civil war, Kennan suggested a militarily divided
country was a better option than a Communist-dominated Italy. John D. Hicherson of the Office
of European Affair promptly rejected the proposal, transcribed in U.S. Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 848–849 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with
appropriate year and volume numbers). A few weeks before the elections the U.S. embassy drew up
an evacuation plan in the event of an uprising, transcribed in FRUS, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 827–830.
See also “Possible Action by the U.S to Assist the Italian Government in the Event of Communist
Seizure of North Italy and the Establishment of an Italian Communist Government in That Area,”
Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, September 24, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, Vol. III, pp. 976–
981.
20. “The Ambassador in Italy (James Dunn) to the Secretary of State” (April 7, 1948), in National
Archives and Record Administration (NARA), Washington DC, Record Group (RG) 59 (General
Records of the Department of State), 865.00/4-748. See also Dunn to Secretary of State, 6 April
1948, in NARA, RG 84, 800: Italy Elections, Box 29; and Arnaldo Cortesi, “Signs of a Communist
Ebb Are Noted in Italy,” The New York Times, 11 April 1948, p. 8.
21. Kaeten Mistry, “The Case for Political Warfare: Strategy, Organization and U.S. Involvement in
the 1948 Italian Election,” Cold War History, Vol. 6, No. 3 (August 2006), pp. 301–329; Mario
Del Pero, “The United States and ‘Psychological Warfare’ in Italy, 1948–1955,” Journal of American
History, Vol. 87, No. 4 (March 2001), pp. 1304–1334; Guido Formigoni, La Democrazia Cristiana e
l’alleanza occidentale (Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, 1996); and James E. Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves:
The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 1983),
pp. 35–55.
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regardless of the Cold War. Ultimately, local actors made the most power-
ful case against the PCI. Theirs was a privileged perspective based on famil-
iarity with Italian society from within, something the U.S. efforts inherently
lacked.
In the 1948 elections the DC and the Civic Committees (Comitati
civici)—an extensive Catholic grassroots network—sought to present the con-
test in strictly binary terms. To vote was no longer a merely practical act but
an ideologically invigorated choice between civilization and barbarism, good
and evil, Christianity and atheism, dictatorship and democracy, clericalism
and anti-clericalism, East and West, truth and falsehood, patriotic feeling and
“alien” ideology.22 The church used its influence in society to resurrect the
idea of a radical alternative: “Either with or against Christ” (o con Cristo, o
contro di Cristo), Pope Pius XII proclaimed in St. Peter Square’s on Christ-
mas Eve 1946. Incongruously, this declaration expressed the same mood that
had been distinctive of Fascist propaganda (“either Rome, or Moscow”). Both
Catholic and DC propaganda relied on and drew pictorial inspiration from
the powerful imagery of the Book of Revelation, as well as other religious
iconography, primarily that of the Renaissance. The propaganda conveyed the
dramatic and eschatological tenor of an impending apocalyptic crisis. Political
posters, often without any peculiar aesthetic qualities, depicted devils, bears,
serpents, or dragons threatening women and children and the very institution
of the family.23 In the crusade against this mélange of evils, Catholic forces
were represented pictorially as angels, knights, and other idiosyncratically pure
beings exuding the aroma of sanctity. The ideological bonds made between
Catholicism and anti-Communism were striking. The threat posed by Com-
munism to the family was the crux of the battle, and all other aspects of the
PCI program paled in comparison. To the traditionalist sensibilities of these
22. On the 1948 elections, see Robert Ventresca, From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the
Italian Elections of 1948 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004); David W. Ellwood, “The 1948
Elections in Italy: A Cold War Propaganda Battle,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television,
Vol. 18, No. 2 (2003), pp. 225–236; Edoardo Novelli, Le elezioni del Quarantotto: Storia, strategia
e immagini della prima campagna elettorale repubblicana (Rome: Donzelli, 2008); and “1948 April
1948: Italy between Continuity and Rupture,” special issue, Modern Italy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2011).
On the “enemy within” as a crucial and consistent feature of 20th-century Italian political struggle,
see Angelo Ventrone, Il nemico interno: Immagini e simboli della lotta politica nell’Italia del Novecento
(Rome: Donzelli, 2005).
23. The serpent/hydra is a well-known symbol of evil in Christian culture, where Satan has often
been represented with “dragon-like features and his limbs . . . entwined with snakes.” See James Hall,
Dictionary of Subjects and Symbols in Arts (London: John Murray, 1974), p. 285. See also James Hall,
A History of Ideas and Images in Italian Art (New York: Harper and Row, 1983). Apart from their
rich religious and folkloric association, images of enemies as animals performed a crucial function of
dehumanizing the enemy and presenting them in a form that confirmed their destructive nature.
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Christian Vote (Civic Committee, 1948). Image Courtesy of Fondazione Vit-
torino Colombo, Milan – Archivio Civico Lodi.
Catholic partisans, the foremost objective of the PCI was the destruction of
the family. All other targets of Communist hostility—be it bourgeois culture,
the Western alliance, or even the prevalent economic system—were strikingly
secondary.
The poster Christian Vote shows the family shielded from the serpents of
divorce and free love, two of the values allegedly upheld by the Communist
Party. The poster alludes to the Renaissance’s artistic rendering of religious
images such as the Holy Family and the Hand of God, perhaps the most rec-
ognizable trope of Michelangelo. Besides the religious connotations, however,
the poster skillfully exploited the need for stability, security, reunion, and rec-
onciliation pervading Italian society after years of warfare and civil strife. Dur-
ing the late stages of World War II, the national state had been left in tatters,
and in the vacuum families, villages, and towns—rather than political heads
or the abstract nation—became the primary sources of allegiance. The conse-
quence was an almost spontaneous strengthening of horizontal loyalties at the
expense of vertical hierarchies: people worked together within tangible net-
works of solidarity rather than within the more vertical structures that tended
102
Portrayal of Communists in Cold War Italy
The Christian Worker (Civic Committee, 1948). Image Courtesy of Fon-
dazione Vittorino Colombo, Milan – Archivio Civico Lodi.
to characterize modern European citizenship. The welfare of one’s immediate
family became the overriding preoccupation of many Italians.24
The poster titled The Christian Worker—another production of the Civic
Committees—depicts the crushing of two dragons’ heads: Communism and
Capitalism. The image is particularly rich in association, suggesting the potent
and highly allegorical legend of St. George and the Dragon, one of the most
popular Christian saints and a favorite of Renaissance art.
In Raphael’s interpretation, St. George’s spear has been broken in the
struggle, but the proud knight is about to vanquish the dragon with the
sword, thereby liberating the abducted princess, who is fleeing on the right. St.
George’s horse looks to the sky as if pleading for divine intervention. Knight
and horse constitute a single, centaur-like creature endowed with divine
24. This was true everywhere in Europe. See Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Cen-
tury (New York: Knopf, 1998), pp. 221–225; and Martin Conway, “Democracy in a Postwar Western
Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model,” European History Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January
2002), pp. 59–84.
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Raphael, St George and the Dragon, oil on canvas, Musée du Louvre, Paris.
favor rather than fallible and mundane physical strength.25 Knight/horse and
dragon, locked in the intimacy of mortal combat, appear as yet another sin-
gle being, a symmetrical but divided figure bound within the same field of
tension. The Christian Worker seeks to retell and reinterpret the same eter-
nal struggle between good and evil, ever present and inescapable in every
epoch. In contrast to Raphael’s St. George, however, the Worker resembles an
embattled giant facing unequal enemies. The artist’s deliberate distortion em-
phasizes the power and the dominance of the worker. The poster is meant to
convey a message of hope and confidence in the strength of the individual
against adversities such as the brutal war experience, the disruptive effects of
technology, and the fascist/totalitarian regimentation of civic life.
Such a representation is not a simple dichotomy: the Worker is destined
to subdue two enemies. The two are not equals. Communism (the sheer force
of nature and brute instinct) is portrayed as a red dragon and therefore looks
25. In the Book of Revelation, Christ rides a white horse at the head of the armies of Heaven to judge
and to make war upon the earth.
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much more ferocious than the frog-like depiction of Capitalism (the fatuous
power of the market and money).26 Although Capitalism is portrayed as a
lesser peril, the two threats are nevertheless extensions of the same monster,
both antithetical to the Catholic tradition. Far from flaunting material pros-
perity as a bulwark against Communism, Catholic forces regarded material-
ism as an irrefutable proof of moral degeneration. Although the United States
vieweed Communism as a threat to its flourishing and entrenched capitalis-
tic system, the Vatican opposed Communism for its explicit atheism. How-
ever, the differences between the Vatican and the White House transcended
their antipathetic analysis of Communism. Pope Pius XII was inclined to de-
tect flaws in both godless Soviet Communism and a dangerously materialistic
Americanism. This critique included a condemnation of a solely economic
definition of the standard of life and the fetishization of technological progress
and material output.
Catholic criticism of both capitalism and socialism dated back to the pub-
lication in 1891 of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum novarum—the manifesto
of what came to be known as “Catholic social thought.”27 To be sure, Leo had
taken the extraordinary step of embracing John Locke’s theory of property as a
natural right and elevating its moral status by asserting that “private ownership
must be held sacred and inviolable.” After all, Rerum novarum sought to tackle
the emerging challenge of socialism, and modernity as a whole, by presenting
its own (Catholic) solution to the social question.28 Yet, Locke’s argument was
26. Italians accustomed to icons and religious painting knew that red was the color of Satan. The color
had also been associated with revolution and disorder since 1792, when the Jacobin Club raised a red
flag as a symbol of rebellion.
27. On the development of Catholic social thought in the 20th century, see Paul Misner, Social Catholi-
cism in Europe: From the Onset of the Industrialization to the First World War (New York: Crossroad,
1991); Paul Misner, “Christian Democratic Social Policy: Precedents for Third Way Thinking,” in
Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg, eds., European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and
Comparative Perspectives (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), pp. 68–92; David
J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds., Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage (Mary-
knoll, NY: Orbis, 1992); Oliver F. Williams and John W. Houck, eds., Catholic Social Thought and
the New World Order: Building on One Hundred Years (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1993); Sabino Frigato, La difficile democrazia: La dottrina sociale della Chiesa da Leone XIII a
Pio XII (1878–1958) (Cantalupa, Italy: Effatà, 2007); John W. Boyer, “Catholics, Christians and the
Challenges of Democracy: The Heritage of the Nineteenth Century,” in Wolfram Kaiser and Hel-
muth Wohnout, eds., Political Catholicism in Europe 1918–1945 (London: Routledge, 2004), esp.
pp. 23–27; and Guido Formigoni, Alla prova della democrazia: Chiesa, cattolici e modernità nel Nove-
cento (Trento: Il Margine, 2008).
28. Paul Furlong and David Curtis, eds., The Church Faces the Modern World: Rerum Novarum and Its
Impact (Scunthorpe, UK: Earlsgate Press, 1994); “Rerum Novarum”: Écriture, contenu et réception d’une
encyclique: Actes du colloque international organisé par l’École française de Rome et le Greco no 2 du CNRS
(Rome, 18–20 avril 1991) (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1997); and Robert P. Kranynak, “Pope
Leo XIII and the Catholic Response to Modernity,” Modern Age, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2007), pp. 527–536.
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qualified by the Thomist doctrine of the best use of property for the common
good, including (limited) state intervention on behalf of working people and
the demand for a just minimum wage.29 Workers’ rights and interests were
the rationale for the papal condemnation of the unfettered and inhumane
practices of nineteenth-century capitalism.30 Capitalism, Leo asserted, was a
system whose guiding ethos was the “greed of unchecked competition.” The
working class, having no protection from the “hardheartedness” and the bru-
tal exploitations of capitalists, was left “surrendered, isolated, and helpless.”
Leo was equally harsh in his assessment of socialism, arguing that state own-
ership of the means of production would ultimately “rob the lawful possessor
[of property], distort the function of the state, and create utter confusion in
the community.” Overall, the idea of social harmony—foreshadowing the ide-
als of twentieth-century corporatism—proved central to Leo’s vision: “Capital
cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results
in the beauty of good order, whereas perpetual conflict necessarily produces
confusion and savage barbarity.”31
Forty years after Rerum novarum, Pope Pius XI again addressed social and
political questions with the encyclical Quadragesimo anno (1931). Although
the last vestiges of the ancient order had been largely swept away in the after-
math of World War I, new forms of authoritarian or totalitarian government
had begun to emerge.32 Wages and conditions of workers had indeed im-
proved since the time of Leo XIII. Nevertheless, the world had been plunged
On the relationship between Catholicism and modernity, see Darell Jodock, ed., Catholicism Contend-
ing with Modernity: Roman Catholic Modernism and anti-Modernism in Historical Context (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Gabriel Daly, “Catholicism and Modernity,” Journal of Amer-
ican Academy of Religion, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1985), pp. 773–96; Pancratius Cornelis Beentjes, ed., The
Catholic Church and Modernity in Europe (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010); Robert P. Krainak, Christian Faith
and Modern Democracy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011); and James L. Heft,
ed., A Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor’s Marianist Award Lecture (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
29. As Ernest Fortin points out, Leo raises the status of property rights to “sacred and inviolable” in
order to match the radical claims of socialism against private property while rejecting the individual-
istic premises of Locke’s philosophy. See Ernest Fortin, “‘Sacred and Inviolable’: Rerum Novarum and
Natural Rights,” Theological Studies, Vol. 63, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 211–214.
30. In the words of a U.S. commentator, Rerum novarum and Leo’s statement that “a small number of
very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself ”
were “the must crushing indictment of the capitalistic system from a conservative authority.” Anthony
J. Beck, “Capitalism and Christian Democracy,” The Catholic World, Vol. 110, No. 657 (December
1919), p. 360.
31. The text can be founded on the official Vatican website, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo
_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_it.html.
32. Pius had recently negotiated an agreement with Mussolini concerning the Vatican state through
the Lateran Treaty (1929), but an uneasy tension still existed.
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into the misery of the Great Depression, an event that again raised serious
questions about the whole capitalist system. Furthermore, the fear that had
so concerned Leo about socialism and its threat to the social order had also
been drastically realized with the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, and
Communist ideas had continued to gain support in Europe. In this context,
Quadragesimo anno was explicitly directed against Communism and social-
ism, defined as “utterly alien to Christian truth.” However, the encyclical was
also critical of unbridled and greedy capitalism, the “economic dictatorship”
that “has replaced a free market.”33 In 1937, confronted with the horrors in
Spain of torched churches and slaughtered religious of both sexes, two years
before the world learned that only two Catholic priests had survived the tra-
vails of Iosif Stalin’s rule, and long before Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain”
discourse, Pius’s encyclical Divini redemptoris branded Communism “the all
too imminent danger . . . which aims at upsetting the social order and un-
dermining the very foundations of Christian civilization.”34 Nevertheless, the
same document emphasized Rome’s doubts over liberalism, capitalism, and
the materialist-based system of the West, seen as an error unto itself without
which the menace of Stalin would never have existed.
Pius XII did not issue a social encyclical. However, the speech he gave
on the feast of Pentecost (1 June 1941) to mark the 50th anniversary of Re-
rum novarum, makes clear that he wanted his own teaching to be seen as a
continuation of that of Leo XIII and Pius XI. In opposition to the totali-
tarian systems that were gaining sway throughout Europe, Pius XII warned
against any interpretation of the common good that would give to the state
the power to “determine at will the manner of his physical, spiritual, religious,
and moral movements in opposition to the personal duties or rights of man
and to this end abolish or deprive of efficacy his natural rights to material
goods.”35 Pius was concerned in a special way about the threat of Stalinist
Communism and its explicit denial of private property, a position Leo XIII
had also condemned. But Pius XII was equally concerned about the arbitrary
confiscations and comprehensive mobilization of resources undertaken by the
Nazis, the Fascists, and assorted political thugs who did not reject property
33. See http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515
_quadragesimo-anno_it.html.
34. See http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19370319
_divini-redemptoris_it.html. The pontiff also cited Leo XIII’s encyclical against Communism, Quod
apostolici muneris (1878).
35. See http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/speeches/1941/documents/hf_p-xii_spe_194106
01_radiomessage-pentecost_it.html.
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rights as such and were instead intent on total social control and personal
enrichment.36
In 1948 the chief concern of Catholics focused on the bedrock of family
and faith. Accordingly, Pius XII felt compelled to make common cause with
Washington against the common foe, momentarily putting aside contrasting
views and philosophy.37 However, the anti-Communist alliance failed to erase
the long history of suspicion between Rome and Washington. Even in the
bleakest years of the Cold War, Italian Catholics could not regard the Soviet
system as the only threat.38 Within the DC, the groups that most outspokenly
opposed U.S. culture and way of life, capitalism and the Atlantic Alliance,
were confined to the left of the party until well into the 1950s.39 Yet, in the
immediate postwar years, the whole party, including the leadership and party
standard-bearer Alcide De Gasperi, flirted with the idea, which some Vati-
can circles supported too, of creating a neutral Christian Europe (or, in a less
ambitious form, a Catholic bloc of Latin European countries), that would be
impervious to the corrupting influence of the different but equally unaccept-
able forms of modern barbarism represented by the U.S. and Soviet models.
The main concern for De Gasperi and other Christian Democrats was the res-
cue and reconstruction of the national state.40 By the late 1940s, international
36. The pope’s language here and his use of such broad categories as “human rights” and “common
good” reflects the influence of Jacques Maritain, the French philosopher whose thought became an im-
portant reference point for political Catholicism and for Christian Democratic parties newly forming
in the post–World War II period. See Bernard Hubert, ed., Jacques Maritain en Europe: La réception
de sa pensée (Paris: Beauchesne, 1996); and Jan Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in
Twentieth-Century Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 135–138.
37. Frank Coppa, “Pope Pius XII and the Cold War: The Postwar Confrontation between Catholi-
cism and Communism,” in Dianne Kirby, ed., Religion and the Cold War (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002), pp. 50–66; and Peter Kent, The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman
Catholic Church and the Division of Europe, 1943–1950 (Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queen University Press,
2002). British and American films and documentaries of the 1950s moved in an opposite direction:
religious themes figured prominently in many films, encouraging audiences to view the Cold War
as a conflict in which capitalism, anti-Communism, and Christianity were synonymous. Tony Shaw,
“Martyrs, Miracles, and Martians: Religion and Cold War Cinematic Propaganda in the 1950s,” Jour-
nal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 3–22.
38. Roy Palmer Domenico, “‘For the Cause of Christ Here in Italy’: America’s Protestant Challenge in
Italy and the Cultural Ambiguity of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2005), p. 625.
39. Paolo Pombeni, Il gruppo dossettiano e la fondazione della democrazia, 1938–1948 (Bologna, Italy: Il
Mulino, 1979); Elisabetta Vezzosi, “La sinistra democristiana tra neutralismo e Patto Atlantico (1947–
1949),” in Ennio Di Nolfo, Roman H. Rainero, and Brunello Vigezzi, eds., L’Italia e la politica di
potenza in Europa (Milan, Italy: Marzorati, 1986), pp. 195–221; and Vera Capperucci, “Le correnti
della Democrazia Cristiana di fronte all’America: Tra differenziazione culturale ed integrazione polit-
ica, 1944–1954,” in Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds., L’anti-americanismo in Italia e in
Europa nel secondo dopoguerra (Soveria Mannelli, Italy: Rubettino, 2004), pp. 249–289.
40. Guido Formigoni, “De Gasperi e l’America tra storia e storiografia,” Studi trentini di scienze
storiche, Vol. 84, No. 2 (2005), pp. 317–334. See also Kaeten Mistry, “The Partnership between the
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and domestic difficulties obliged the DC and De Gasperi to attenuate and
eventually abandon their most high-sounding nationalist rhetoric. The pro-
gressive inclusion of Italy in what New York Times correspondent and editori-
alist Anne McCormick labeled the “New Atlantis” led both the United States
and the DC to seek an ideological convergence through the elaboration of
a shared and often artificial Atlantic mythology.41 As the Italian experience
demonstrates, the Cold War was a complex and nuanced phenomenon and
not always an obvious duel between a clearly liberal democracy and unadul-
terated Marxism-Leninism.42
Contributing to the vilification of Communists in postwar Italy was the
ancient conflation of Russia, whose identity as Western has ever been in doubt,
with Asian barbarism. Images depicting Russians as ferocious brutes, with a
weakness for alcohol and a penchant for rape, sowed the seeds of fear among
many Italians. Russians, after all, were not simply Communists, proponents
of an alien ideology, but Mongoloid Asiatics whose kinsman Attila had im-
periled Italian and Roman civilization centuries earlier. These qualities, com-
bined with the official atheism of the Soviet Union, inspired many Italians
(and other Europeans) to conflate the Red Menace with the Yellow Menace,
thus stirring in the imagination lurid images of bloodthirsty Mongols and
rampaging Cossacks with knives between their teeth.
Such images reinforced one of the most pervasive memories of the Soviet
Union to emerge in postwar Italy: the Asiatic power that had invaded and
subdued Europe. Similar posters had appeared in French anti-Bolshevik pro-
paganda at the end of World War I, and a similar sentiment had swept the
West when the Turkish colossus was perceived to be the foremost threat to
Res publica Christiana.43 The implication was that if one scrapes a Russian,
Democrazia Cristiana and the United States, 1947–1948,” 49th Parallel: An Interdisciplinary Journal
of North American Studies, No. 14 (Summer 2004), pp. 202–218.
41. Anne O’ Hare McCormick, “Cause and Effect of the Rise of the New Atlantis,” The New York
Times, 23 March 1949, p. 15. See also Mario Del Pero, L’alleato scomodo: Gli Stati Uniti e la
Democrazia Cristiana negli anni del centrismo, 1948–1955 (Rome, Italy: Carocci, 2001); Mario Del
Pero, “Containing Containment: Rethinking Italy’s Experience during the Cold War,” Journal of Mod-
ern Italian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 2003), pp. 532–555; and Alessandro Brogi, A Question of
Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and in Italy, 1944–1958 (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2002).
42. On the need to go beyond binary dichotomies, see Martin H. Folly, “Cold War Dichotomies,”
Journal of American Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (December 2000), pp. 503–508. On the role of the ide-
ological opposition between liberal-democracy and Marxism-Leninism, see Mark Kramer, “Ideology
and the Cold War,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (October 1999), pp. 539–576; and
David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962,” in Leffler and Westad,
eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, pp. 20–43.
43. Jules Grandjouan, Créateur de l’affiche politique illustrée en France (Paris, France: Somogy, 2001);
Patricia Spingborg, Western Republican and the Oriental Prince (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992),
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Are You Waiting for Him? (Civic Committee, 1948). Image Courtesy of Fon-
dazione Vittorino Colombo, Milan – Archivio Civico Lodi.
a thinly veiled Tartar emerges. During the early years of the Cold War, sev-
eral leading European figures—from Churchill to Konrad Adenauer—alluded
to the Soviet Union as an Oriental despotism.44 The enduring nature of
these stereotypes was evident when similar images were frequently invoked
in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia after 1989. Perhaps with the demise
of Communism, nationalist leaders in these countries wished to differentiate
themselves from the “Eastern” identity of the Soviet Union in order to be ac-
cepted by the West and thereby gain the political advantages of membership
in NATO and the European Union.45
In 1948, memories of invasion were not far removed in the Italian mind.
Indeed, in the last years of the war Italians had been exposed to a condition of
p. 20; and Robert Schwoebel, The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk, 1453–
1517 (Nieuwkoop, The Netherlands: B. de Graaf, I967), p. 23.
44. Churchill quoted by Sir Ian Jacob in Michael Charlton, The Eagle and the Small Birds: Crisis in
the Soviet Empire: From Yalta to Solidarity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 43; and
Konrad Adenauer, Briefe, 1945–1947, ed. by Hans Peter Mensing (Berlin: Siedler, 1983), p. 191.
45. Ivor B. Neumann, “Europe’s Post–Cold War Memory of Russia: Cui Bono?” in Jan-Werner
Müeller, ed., Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in Presence of the Past (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 121–136.
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traumatic incivility. To take but a few examples, Cossack units fighting along-
side Germans and Moroccan soldiers (Goumiers) accompanying Free French
forces plunged both the Friuli (in the northeast of the country) and the Ciocia-
ria (south of Rome) regions into nightmares of violence and rape. Of course,
Cossacks and, especially, Moroccans are quite different from ethnic Russians.
However, the Italian experience with these non-European and non-white sol-
diers stimulated traditional prejudices in the struggle against Communists in
1948. But during the period from 1944 to 1946—the final phases of the war
and the earliest stage of the postwar era—the story was markedly different. As
Time’s selection of Stalin as its Man of the Year in 1943 illustrates, World War
II triggered the development and perpetuation of the myth of Stalin. Among
Italians—who avoided hosting Soviet troops on their soil—the myth of Stalin
was especially strong. Even Christian Democrats spoke of the Soviet Union in
a reverential tone. For example, on 23 July 1944—six weeks after the libera-
tion of Rome—De Gasperi characterized the USSR as a present-day version of
the melting-pot: “I see the Russians made up of 160 different ethnics groups
overcoming the differences between Asia and Europe.” He averred that “this
effort toward the unification of human society is, allow me to say, a Christian
effort, it is universalistic in the sense of Catholicism.”46 From 1944 through
1946 such sentiments were widespread.47 Only the Vatican under Pius XII
and the Jesuit Order stood firm in denouncing the inhumanity of Commu-
nism, and they soon were pushed by the Allied powers—and especially the
United States—to moderate their heated rhetoric.48 But with the onset of the
Cold War everything changed dramatically.
46. The speech, entitled “La democrazia cristiana e il momento politico,” was first published by the
DC’s newspaper Il Popolo (25 July 1944) and later in Quaderni della Democrazia Cristiana, no. 4
(Rome: SELI, 1944); and Alcide De Gasperi, Discorsi politici, ed. by Tommaso Bozza (Rome: Cinque
Lune, 1956), pp. 1–20.
47. Donald Sassoon, “Italian Images of Russia, 1945–56,” in Duggan and Wagstaff, eds., Italy in
the Cold War, pp. 189–202. The prospect for Soviet-Italian diplomatic relations looked good after
the end of the war. See Nina D. Smirnova, “Soviet-Italian Relations, 1945–8,” in Francesca Gori
and Silvio Pons, eds., The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53 (London: MacMillan,
1996), pp. 375–382. As late as 4 February 1946, the Italian ambassador in Moscow, Pietro Quaroni,
lamented the “anti-Soviet stance of the majority of the Italian press,” which undermined the politics
of friendship and collaboration pursued by Italian diplomats, and he urged the Soviet Union not to
confuse Italian interest with “issues related to someone else’s imperialism, although outwardly depicted
as battles between opposite ideologies.” See Memorandum from Piietro Quaroni, 4 February 1946,
in Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Serie Affari Politici, 1946–1950, b. URSS 2, f.
Rapporti con l’Unione Sovietica.
48. On 9 September 1941, Pius XII received a letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt claiming that the
Soviet Union was on the brink of introducing some form of religious freedom and that the Soviet
dictatorship was less dangerous than the Nazi variant. Roosevelt thus concluded that the survival of the
USSR would prove less dangerous to religious life. See Myron C. Taylor, ed., Wartime Correspondence
between President Roosevelt and Pius XII (New York: MacMillan, 1947), p. 61. On the role played by
Myron Taylor in conveying to the United States the Vatican’s fears about an impending Communist
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Roberto Rossellini, Rome Open City (1945).
The Communist as Resister
In the post-Fascist cinema, the first Italian Communist to be portrayed was the
partisan Giorgio Manfredi, one of the main characters of Roberto Rossellini’s
Rome, Open City (1945), who suffers terrible torture and eventually dies as
a martyr without revealing the secrets of the Resistance. As he is pinned to
the wall dying, Manfredi (the actor Marcello Pagliero) is photographed in a
manner strongly reminiscent of Christ’s death.
In 1991, Claudio Pavone argued that the period from 1943 to 1945
should be interpreted as one in which three wars were fought simultaneously:
a patriotic war, a class war, and a civil war.49 From 1943 to1947, however, the
anti-Fascist forces imposed a starker image that stressed some features while
erasing others. In this narrative, the Resistance was lauded as a second Risorgi-
mento, a national and patriotic war of liberation supported by a populace that
rallied around soldiers and partisans to defeat Nazis and Fascists.50 Commu-
nists supported and may even have motivated such an interpretation. The Re-
sistance as a second Risorgimento constituted a key discursive strategy adopted
takeover, see Ennio Di Nolfo, Dear Pope: Vaticano e Stati Uniti: La corrispondenza segreta di Roosevelt
and Truman con Papa Pacelli (Rome, Italy: In-Edit-A, 2003).
49. Claudio Pavone, Una guerra civile: Saggio storico sulla moralità della Resistenza (Turin, Italy: Bollati
Boringhieri, 1991).
50. The Risorgimento (literally, “Rising Again” or “Resurgence”) was the nineteenth-century movement
for Italian unification that culminated in the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861.
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by the PCI for several decades to establish its national-democratic credentials.
Far from being an international movement inspired by foreign ideologies, this
new narrative enabled Italian Communists to portray themselves as an au-
thentic indigenous force fighting for human dignity.51
But beyond the rhetorical strategy deployed by the Communist Party as
a means of political legitimation, the sacrifice in the historical struggle against
Fascism, so powerfully rendered by Rossellini with the death of Manfredi,
acquired a profound symbolic and existential meaning for Communists—to
an extent and a degree unknown to other Italians. Yes, Catholics, other par-
tisans, and civilian victims of the terror unleashed by the Nazis and Fascists
had died alongside Communists for all of Italy so that the country might
be reborn—as Rome, Open City powerfully portrays, reenacting in microcos-
mic form the greater Christian narrative of the redemption and renewal of
the world. This symbolic reading is reinforced by the execution of the priest
Don Pietro (Aldo Fabrizi) and by the gut-wrenching death of the popolana
Pina (Anna Magnani)—killed by a burst of machine-gun fire and held by the
priest in his lap in a reverse pietà.52 The renewal of Italy required the blood
of reconciliation: the experience of sacrifice and martyrdom purified individ-
uals and the community, removed violence and evil (Nazis and Fascists), pro-
viding the generative principle for social cohesion and for restoration of (a
new) order.53 What made the fate of Manfredi and thousands of Communist
51. Both the Italian and the French Communist Parties reinforced their patriotic credentials by em-
bracing the rhetoric of national prestige. Alessandro Brogi, Confronting America: The Cold War between
the United States and the Communists in France and in Italy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2011), pp. 16–24.
52. The Pietà, or image of the Virgin Mary holding Jesus after the crucifixion, was a frequent subject
in Renaissance and pre-Renaissance art. Several scholars have commented on the religious meaning of
Rome, Open City. In 1946, Meyer Schapiro, a professor at Columbia University, provided one of the
first critical examinations of the film that focused on its Christian motifs. Schapiro believed the film
assumed “the pattern of a familiar Christian legend,” and he stated that, because the action takes place
in Rome, the two male partisans, Manfredi and Pina’s fiancé, Francesco, evoke Saints Peter and Paul,
who were both martyred there. Furthermore, because Don Pietro did not face the firing squad as was
the usual custom, his execution recalls Saint Peter’s inverted crucifixion. See Meyer Schapiro, “A Note
on ‘The Open City,’” New International, Vol. 12, No. 10 (December 1946), pp. 311–313. Support for
a Christological reading stems from Rossellini’s identity as a Christian humanist and from the candidly
Christian subject matter of many of his later films, such as Francesco, giullare di Dio (The Flowers of St.
Francis, 1950), Augustine of Hippo (1972), and The Messiah (1975). See also Peter Brunette, Roberto
Rossellini (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 41–60; and P. Adams Sitney, Vital Crisis
in Italian Cinema: Iconography, Stylistics, Politics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), pp. 28–43.
53. Sacrifice is inseparable from the sacred: the word “sacrifice” literally means “to make sacred.” For
the theoretical implications, see René Girard, Des choses caches depuis la fondation du monde (Paris:
Grasset & Fasquelle, 1978); and René Girard, Le sacrifice (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France,
2003). For a historical and contextual analysis, see Rosario Forlenza, “Sacrificial Memory and Political
Legitimacy in Post-war Italy: Reliving and Remembering World War II,” History & Memory, Vol. 24,
No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2012), pp. 73–116.
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partisans distinctive was their willingness to die not only for the rebirth of
Italy but also for a greater cause: the coming of Communism. Communists
sentenced to death would write letters just before execution as a way of reaf-
firming a presence in the world, and as a powerful symbol of personal ex-
perience, cramming them with references to sacrifice.54 A young Communist
partisan wrote in February 1944,
Edda, I have been condemned to death, they will kill me; but they kill my body,
not the idea inside me. I die, I die without any remorse, for I am proud to
sacrifice my life for a cause, for a just cause, and I hope my sacrifice will not
be in vain, but instead will help the great struggle. It is this cause I have been
serving faithfully and always hoping that every sacrifice will be rewarded.55
Antonio Gramsci considered the elision of the self through sacrifice necessary
in times of war and revolution. For Gramsci the individual may justify the
value of his or her action and the sacrifice of his or her own and others’ lives
on the basis of a belief in the historical change(s) that will someday be brought
about by others, even after the sacrificed individual has long since ceased to
exist.56 In this way, the dead outlive death and live beyond their sacrifice, re-
maining among the living. Surviving and future Communist militants would
be overburdened with the duty of bringing the cause to a successful comple-
tion. This would give meaning to both individual and communal experiences
and eventually to all of history.
Both Gramsci and, before him, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in The
Communist Manifesto, thus extended one of the oldest eschatological myths
of the Mediterranean world: the redemption of the elects (in this case the
Communists, whose suffering is invoked to change the ontological status of
the world), following an apocalyptic class conflict at the “end of history.” The
54. Tzvetan Todorov points out that epic heroes tend to valorize a glorious death in combat over
the pursuit of normal life, as they must die in battle to achieve immortality. See Tzvetan Todorov,
Face à l’extrême (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 19. On the symbolization of experience, see Eric Voegelin,
“Equivalence and Symbolization in History” (1970), in The Collected Works, Vol. 12, Published Essays,
1966–1985 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 115–133; and Eric Voegelin, The New
Sciences of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 27–41.
55. Piero Malvezzi and Giovanni Pinelli, eds., Lettere di condannati a morte della Resistenza italiana: 8
settembre 1943–25 aprile 1945 (Turin: Einaudi, 1974), p. 123. See also Mario Avagliano, ed., Gener-
azione ribelle: Diari e lettere dal 1943 al 1945 (Turin: Einaudi 2006), pp. 179–231.
56. As Italo Calvino remarked in a 1949 article on the literature of Resistance, Gramsci’s letters from
prison (first, although not completely, published in 1947) are among the most astonishing of all
modern testaments to revolutionary courage and self-abnegation. Calvino notes that “serenity” and
“strength” are the qualities that make Gramsci representative of the revolutionary spirit of the Resis-
tance itself. See Italo Calvino, “La letteratura italiana nella Resistenza,” Il movimento di Liberazione in
Italia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1949), p. 46.
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myth of the classless society, the withering away of the state, and the disap-
pearance of all historical tensions finds its most exact precedent in the myth of
the Golden Age that, typically, lies at the beginning and at the end of history
(and therefore, like all myths, outside ordinary time). With their sacrifice in
the Resistance, Communists could cast a messianic role for themselves and for
the party based on the self-image of heroic engagement in the historical battle
against the evils of Fascism and Nazism. This was even more the case in post-
war Italy. When collaboration between Communists and Catholics ended, the
Communists turned to fighting the “new fascism,” by which they meant the
elected Christian Democratic governments, the Vatican, and Western capital-
ism. The symbolic underpinning and moral foundation of the (new) Com-
munist identity lay in the sacrifice of men like Manfredi.
Consequently, Communists—and perhaps only Communists—
remembered the Resistance as an “auroral” moment signaling the beginning
of extraordinary changes not only in the social and political context but in
personal values, worldviews, and ways of life.57 The Communist Resistance
seemed in this sense a liminal period when the normal social structure had
broken down and the individual had escaped previous lives and roles to
define a new self and bring about the birth of a new human being.58 In an
autobiography written in 1951 by a Communist militant—a former partisan,
who had been brought up in Catholicism—a palpable sense of transformation
emerges:
As a member of a partisan band I felt I was part of a new life. . . . I realized
that in the mountains, being a partisan, I was not only there to combat the
German and the Fascist, but also to fight for a better world, and for a more just,
human, and fraternal society; a society driven by work, free from oppression and
exploitation.59
57. See the testimonies of Catholic and Communist workers collected four decades later by anthro-
pologist Liliana Lanzardo in Turin. Although Communists considered the Resistance a total (political
and existential) transformative experience, Catholics saw it as a temporary “storm” after which “calm”
and “peace” (a return to normality) would and should follow, and not the beginning of a new way
to look at life, the discovery of politics, or the modification of behaviors, moral values, or deep mo-
tivations. Liliana Lanzardo, Personalità operaia e coscienza di classe: Comunisti e cattolici nelle fabbriche
torinesi del dopoguerra (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1989), pp. 87–118 (Communists), and pp. 201–258
(Catholics).
58. For the concept of liminality, see Arnold Van Gennep, Les rites de passage (Paris, France: Picard
1981); Victor Turner, “Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage,” in The Forest
of Symbols: Aspects of the Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 93–111; and
Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).
59. The text is in Gian Carlo Onnis, “La gioia di essere e il sacrificio di vivere: Autobiografie di
comunisti savonesi 1945–1956,” Ventesimo secolo, Vol. 3, No. 7–8 (January–August 1993), p. 128.
For other cases of “conversion” to Communism through participation in the Resistance, understood
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Accordingly, no historical symbolism carried more weight in the postwar
Communist imaginary than the Resistance. Militants who joined the PCI af-
ter the war felt crippled and deprived of a major component of their political
and existential identity. This is why the main character of Guido Morselli’s
autobiographical novel Il Comunista (The Communist) perceives and defines
himself as a “second-order” Communist—one who was not been forged and
baptized in the epic struggle of good versus evil.60
In the popular literature of postwar Italy, Communists took multiple
forms. Sometimes they were depicted as workers, intellectuals, and revolu-
tionaries. On other occasions, they were characterized as peasants, union or-
ganizers, or political commissioners. In a majority of cases, Communists took
the form of the Resistance fighter—the hero of the partisan bands who, in
the civil war from 1943 to 1945, sought to vanquish the Fascist forces.61 In
almost all cases, these figures were men. A lone exception is Renata Viganò’s
1949 novel L’Agnese va a morire (Agnes is Going to Die), a canonical text of
the (Communist) Resistance in which the ethos of (self-)sacrifice projected by
Rome, Open City and conveyed by the partisans’ letters finds a comparable lit-
erary representation.62 However, even here the traditional hierarchy between
gender holds, and in chapter after chapter the childless, semi-literate, elderly
peasant washerwoman Agnes slowly yet relentlessly disappears from the fore-
ground until the third and final part of the novel is entirely dominated by
the group of (male) partisans to whom she offered material and emotional
support in the struggle against the enemy.
Typically, the Resistance fighter is depicted as a proletarian (or peas-
ant) whom the writer’s alter ego (usually an intellectual or someone from a
as the beginning of a new life, see Adriano Ballone, “Una sezione, un paese: Appunti per una storia
del militante comunista, 1921–1981,” Rivista di Storia Contemporanea, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July 1981), p.
439. According to Calvino, “the greatest example of the new man born from this Resistance is surely
the serene and immensely strong Sardinian revolutionary [Gramsci],” the author of “the greatest book
of the Resistance.” Calvino, “La letteratura italiana nella Resistenza,” p. 46.
60. Guido Morselli, Il comunista, in Elena Borsa and Sara d’Arienzo, eds., Romanzi (Milan: Adelphi,
2002), p. 941. The novel was first published in 1976 but had been written twenty years earlier.
61. Anna Baldini, Il comunista: Una storia letteraria dalla Resistenza agli anni Settanta (Turin: Utet,
2009).
62. The sacrifice is evoked by the title and the protagonist’s baptismal name: “Agnes” derives from the
Latin word for “lamb,” and Christ was the Lamb of God, the Agnus Dei. Christ’s sacrifice is suggested
by the visual representation of Agnes’s death (the four bullets used for her execution form the sign
of the cross on her face). (This detail is overlooked by Giuliano Montaldo’s cinematic adaption of
the novel in 1976.) Finally, sacrifice is explicit in Agnes’s pronouncement on personal sacrifice in
the context of the larger cause of the Resistance. Renata Viganò, L’Agnese va a morire (1949; Turin:
Einaudi, 1982), pp. 228–229 (for Agnes’s pronouncement).
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bourgeois background) meets as a comrade-in-arms during the civil war.63 In
this trope, the cosmopolitan learns from the proletarian. Through that experi-
ence, the intellectual comes to realize that the salvation of Italy is to be found
not in libraries or universities but in the virtue of the popolo, in the simple
wisdom of a humble people whose vigor and unsophisticated understanding
has the power to save the individual from degradation and, in the process, to
heal Italian society.64
In the immediate postwar period, Communist parties were not strong in
most European countries, but the Italian Communists were buoyant. In their
minds, they had defeated Fascism and therefore were part of the movement of
history, their actions just and their interpretations correct even if their fellow
countrymen did not yet agree. This is most evident in the words of Kim, the
partisan hero of Italo Calvino’s novel The Path to the Spiders’ Nest:
That age-old resentment which weighs down on Dritto’s men, on all of us, in-
cluding you and me, and which finds expression in shooting and killing enemies,
the Fascists have that too: it forces them to kill with the same hope of purifica-
tion and of release. But then there is also the question of history. The fact is that
on our side nothing is lost, not a single gesture, not a shot, though each may be
the same as theirs—d’you see what I mean?—they will all serve if not to free us
and our children, to create a world that is serene, without resentment, a world in
which no one has to be bad. The others are on the side of lost gestures, of useless
resentment, which are lost and useless even if they should win, because they are
not making positive history.65
The theories of Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Stalin, and Gramsci imbued the
lives of Communists with an important sense of meaning. The inescapable
and scientifically proven triumph of the proletariat sustained the superior-
ity complex that pervaded Italian Communism. Although the future classless
63. In this, L’Agnese is no exception. Viganò came from a middle-class family, was trained as a nurse,
published her first book of poetry at eleven and her first novel at 33. Viganò had participated in the
Resistance as the director of health services for the Communist guerrilla units in the area around
Ravenna. She noted that the novel reflected the historical reality of the Resistance and that Agnes was
a “real” person, in the sense of a composite, emblematic figure representing the actual experience of
thousands of women. Renata Viganò, “La storia di Agnese non è fantasia,” l’Unità, Milan edition,
17 November 1949; and Renata Viganò, Matrimonio in brigata (Milan: Vangelista, 1976), p. 143.
However, even though the novel can be said to document the Resistance and women’s contribution to
the struggle, it also effectively participates in the mythologization of the Resistance.
64. The representation of the Communist resister would assume an anti-rhetorical and anti-heroic
stance from the 1960s onward. See Luigi Meneghello, I piccoli maestri (Milan, Italy: Rizzoli, 1964);
and Beppe Fenoglio, Il partigiano Johnny (Turin: Einaudi, 1968).
65. Italo Calvino, The Path to the Spiders’ Nest, trans. by A. Colquhoun, revised by M. Mc Laughlin
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1988), pp. 140–141.
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society was inevitable, Communists were supposed to act directly and en-
thusiastically for the good of humanity. The only way to redeem society was
through an act of will: by being willing to sacrifice everything at the altar
of the all-absorbing grand endeavor. Through sustained sacrifice—first in war
against the forces of Fascism; then in peace engulfed in a world of capitalism—
Communists were inclined to see themselves as a new variety of human being.
Oral history interviews collected many decades later, as well as the autobiogra-
phies written by militants, reveal that, for them, joining the party meant cross-
ing the threshold into a superior state of brotherhood.66 As Chiara Sereni, the
daughter of Communist leader Emilio Sereni, later wrote, to be Communist
meant to beat back the “gray,” to rub out the “old Adam” and become a “new
man.”67
The Communist as Friend
Although Catholic authorities and Christian Democrats had some success in
portraying Communists as a dark force in political life, within the larger po-
litical culture of postwar Italy the meaning of Communism—the emotions it
engendered and the hopes it ignited—was a contested matter. In the minds
of many, Stalinism and Communism were benevolent forces. For example,
in 1952 a young Gillo Pontecorvo—who later became famous for his direc-
tion of La battaglia di Algeri (The Battle of Algiers, 1966)—narrated the story
of the generous assistance Moscow provided to Polesine, the area around the
Po River delta, which was struck by a devastating flood in November 1951.
Funded by the Italian labor unions and the PCI, Pontecorvo’s first effort pre-
sented the Soviet Union as a “great friend of the people” and a champion of
anti-fascism.68 Pontecorvo’s documentary resonated with many, as millions of
Italian Communists had looked to the Soviet Union as a beacon of hope even
66. See, for example, Boarelli, La fabbrica del passato, pp. 89–95; and Onnis, “La gioia di essere e il
sacrificio di vivere,” pp. 105, 111–116. Communist autobiographical narratives and oral testimonies
are usually organized around the principle of the quasi-biological predestination of being Communist.
See, for example, the memoirs of Antonio Roasio, Figlio della classe operaia (Milan: Vangelista, 1977),
p. 5.
67. Chiara Sereni, Il gioco dei regni (Florence: Giunti, 2000), pp. 348–349. On the militants’ preten-
sion to devise and build a new human being, see also Ballone, “Una sezione, un paese,” p. 449.
68. The Timiriazev Mission, shooting directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, 24 min., 1952, in Audiovisual
Archive of the Workers’ Democratic Movement (AAMOD). A film entitled Dopo la tempesta (After
the storm) produced by the DC portrays the “solidarity between free nations” in favor of Polesine
but makes no mention of Soviet help. Dopo la tempesta, 10 min., 1953, in Archivio Audiovisivo della
Democrazia Cristiana (AADC).
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before the flood. In the revolutionary writings of the PCI, “class liberation,”
the “proletarian uprising,” and the “revolutionary struggle” were understood
as historical processes that did not need to arise—in fact, never could—from
within Italy. Instead, the revolution would be ushered in by Stalin’s tanks.
The experience of World War II had transformed Italian attitudes toward
Stalin, Communism, and the Soviet Union, giving rise to such sentiments.
From the perspective of millions of Italians in 1942, the loudest critics of
Mussolini were Communists living abroad. Even more important, the pri-
mary threat to the existence of Fascism came from the Red Army. With the
Battle of Stalingrad (August 1942–February 1943), where the Germans and
their Italian allies suffered their most decisive defeat, the cause of Italian Com-
munism received its greatest boost.69 In their yearning for the end of censure
and persecution, in their celebration of Mussolini’s ignominious defeat, in
their abandonment of tradition, and in their search for a new and more just
political order was born the myth of Stalin. One would look in vain for a
synthesized political philosophy or a coherent articulation of Marxist princi-
ples at the heart of this veneration, however. These new believers, after all,
were frequently illiterate. Some were devout Catholics, and many had been
apolitical or were even former Fascists. The catastrophic results of Stalingrad
tolled the death knell for Il Duce and his lieutenants, and this was a prospect
many Italians by then desperately desired. For millions who entered the Com-
munist ranks from 1943 to 1946, Stalinism was opaque and obscure, but it
represented antifascism and the future. Their political migration was due less
to a turn of mind than to a change in that subtler organ, the heart.
Reinforcing the myth of Stalin, the assistance Moscow provided to the
victims of the 1951 flood was abetted by the documentarian efforts of Pon-
tecorvo, whose film celebrates the camaraderie of Italians and Soviets, forged
by their mutual victimization at the hand of the Nazi oppressors. As the nar-
rator observes toward the end of the film:
Crimean sailors and Genoan workers understand each other perfectly. They even
share common stories. Eight years ago, in Western as well as in Eastern Europe,
the same battle was fought to kick the German invaders out of our own Land.70
69. For a powerful echo of the myth of the Red Army and Stalingrad among Communists, see Danilo
Montaldi, Militanti politici di base (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), pp. 214, 276, 338; and Boarelli, La fabbrica
del passato, pp. 60–62.
70. See also the 1964 movie Italiani, brava gente, directed by Communist Giuseppe De Santis. The
movie—a Russo-Italian coproduction titled Attack and Retreat in English and Oni shli na Vostok in
Russian—focuses on Italian troops fighting on the Eastern Front. A solidarity war epic, the work
hinges on the plot device of Italians and Soviets forming a united front against their one-time ally, the
Germans.
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The reality was, however, very different. Beginning in July 1942, with the Ger-
mans advancing hundreds of kilometers a day, Mussolini sent Italian troops
to the USSR in an attempt to ensure that Fascist Italy would share in what
appeared to be the spoils of an impending victory. Less than six months later,
the Soviet Red Army severed the Italian lines at Stalingrad. Defeated, the Ital-
ian Army in Russia (ARMIR) suffered enormous casualties and was forced to
retreat.
That Pontecorvo’s documentary inspired a large following and succeeded
in garnering considerable acclaim is voluble testimony to the power of the
Stalin myth. But the power of this myth should not be overstated. Alongside
the sympathetic Communist portrayal existed a powerful counternarrative,
one first formulated by the Fascists but later embraced, albeit in an altered
form, by Christian Democrats and Catholic propaganda in 1948. This narra-
tive painted Soviet citizens in the darkest, most sinister pigments and in the
broadest of negative strokes.
Recent scholarship has provided a great deal of compelling evidence—
derived from war diaries, mail censorship reports, letters from the front, and
other contemporary sources—that the Soviet population was described in
terms strikingly similar to those used in Nazi sources. Time and again, So-
viet citizens were characterized as “repulsive,” “filthy people,” and “more like
beasts than humans.” Such depictions suggest that Fascist propaganda, com-
fortingly dismissed after 1943 as ineffectual, provided the enduring categories
through which large numbers of Italian soldiers perceived anyone from the
USSR—and this prehistory of Fascist visual representation of Communism
returned in postwar Catholic and Christian Democratic propaganda.71 The
influence of the Roman Catholic Church was also evident in the letters sol-
diers sent home affirming God’s partisanship in the anti-Soviet crusade: “[on]
one side stands Christianity, and on the other Jewry.”72 As Marla Stone has
71. On the Fascists’ racial propaganda, see Aaron Gillette, Racial Theories in Fascist Italy (London:
Routledge, 2002). On the continuity between Fascist and 1948 Catholic propaganda, see Luciano
Cheles, “Picture Battle in Piazza: The Political Poster,” in Luciano Cheles and Lucio Sponza, eds.,
The Art of Persuasion: Political Communication in Italy from 1945 to the 1990s (Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 2001), p. 131. This is hardly surprising given that not only had many of
the artists who designed the posters for the Civic Committees worked for the Fascist regime, but the
Christian Democrats were addressing the same masses who, only a few years earlier, had endorsed the
campaign for the purity of the race. See also Mirco Dondi, “The Fascist Mentality after Fascism,” in
Richard J. B. Bosworth and Patrizia Dogliani, eds., Italian Fascism: History, Memory and Representation
(London, UK: MacMillan, 1999), pp. 144–160.
72. Thomas Schlemmer, ed., Die Italiener und der Ostfront 1942–43: Dokumente zu Mussolinis Krieg
gegen die Sowjetunion (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); and Alessandro Massignani, Alpini e Tedesci sul
Don: Documenti e testimonianze sulla ritirata del Corpo d’armata alpino e del XXIV Panzerkorps german-
ico in Russia nel gennaio 1943 (Novale di Valdagno, Italy: Rossato, 1991).
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Ezio Castelluci, Requisition (1942).
Source: Prima mostra degli artisti italiani in armi: Catalogo (Rome: Stato Mag-
giore del Regio Esercito, Ufficio Propaganda 1942), p. 26. © Istituto Storico
e di Cultura dell’Arma del Genio.
insightfully shown, “Ezio Castellucci, painter and captain in the Italian Ex-
peditionary Forces on the Eastern Front, gave aesthetic form to ideas about
Communist/Russian degeneracy.” In a series of ink drawings, Stone contin-
ues, “Castellucci renders the soldiers of the Red Army,” as well as “Russian
women and children” as “sub-human, animal-like apparitions” in “an unfor-
giving landscape of deprivation and violence.” In Requisizione (Requisition,
1942), Stone further explains, “he depicts a Red Army soldier pillaging the
hut of a terrified peasant woman.” Thus, “surrounded by the furniture he
has ransacked, the soldier heads for the door.” “The peasant woman,” Stone
continues in her dense and convincing analysis, “cowers next to an icon of the
Virgin, which, though small, is rendered the central object in the room.” She
explains: “The ghoulish, smirking soldier appears threatening to the viewer,
while the peasant woman looks sadly in the other direction.” Stone then
adds: “between them is a covered corpse,” perhaps “the woman’s murdered
husband.” Thus, Stone concludes: “The soldier, with his pointy ears,” his
“sunken” face, and his “beady eyes” is essentially a “demonic” apparition.73
73. Marla Stone, “The Changing Face of the Enemy in Fascist Italy,” Constellations, Vol. 15, No. 3
(2008), pp. 332–350.
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The Communist Next Door
In the postwar period, films were important weapons in the arsenal of Italy’s
Communists. Although directors such as Pontecorvo used film to celebrate
the benevolence of the Soviet Union, others such as Carlo Lizzani, Giuseppe
De Santis, and Aldo Vergani used cinema for a different purpose. Under their
careful oversight, movies emphasized the connection between Italian Com-
munists and the larger popolo, as well as between the Communist Party and
the Italian past. For example, Lizzani’s Modena, una città dell’Emilia Rossa
(Modena: A city of the Red Emilia, 1950) lauds the achievements of the
Communist-led government in Modena. Through the voice of the narrator,
contemporary Modena—under the control of its local PCI committee—is
depicted as the progeny of many fathers: from imperial Rome and the city-
state of the medieval era to the thriving communities of the Renaissance and
the patriots who embraced the Risorgimento in the nineteenth century and
the anti-Fascist Resistance in the 1940s. Although implicit, Lizzani’s message
was obvious: Communism in Modena, and presumably in other parts of Italy,
was the offspring—indeed, the culmination—of Italian sensibilities, Italian
culture, Italian ingenuity, and Italian history.74 Despite its transalpine roots,
this vast international movement of human redemption bore the unmistak-
able stamp of Italianization.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Modena was widely known as a city
with a radical working class movement. Accordingly, anti-Communists de-
picted it as a city ravaged by civil strife even after liberation. According to this
narrative, Communists had filled the trenches with the bodies of collabora-
tors, priests, and landowners. This urban legend was lurid and tactical, but
the Right’s portrayal of Modena as a city torn by ideological division was not
without merit. In 1948 and 1949, a wave of political and social protest swept
across the city. In 1950 six factory workers—all of them Communists—were
killed by the police. These events, however, are entirely absent from the film,
as the director tried to reassure the audience that Modena was a city on the
rise, well governed, civic-spirited, proud of its long tradition, and fully at ease
with the modern world.75
74. Modena, una città dell’Emilia, dir. by Carlo Lizzani, 26 min., 1950, in AAMOD.
75. We get an inkling of possible trouble in another Lizzani film, I fatti di Modena, 6 min., 1950,
in AAMOD. On the ability of the Communist councils to implement policies aimed at promoting
working-class interests against the wishes of the less sympathetic national government, see Rosario
Forlenza, “The Italian Communist Party, Local Government and the Cold War,” Modern Italy, Vol.
15, No. 2 (May 2010), pp. 177–196. In the anti-Communist propaganda, towns and cities led by
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Surprisingly, Modena, una città dell’Emilia Rossa was not seriously influ-
enced by neorealism. Instead it adopted a rhetorical style that echoes both the
Fascist newsreels and the stylistic excesses of socialist-realist cinema. Individ-
uals, therefore, are never dissociated from collective images and celebrations.
Stripped of their particularity, citizens are categorized as part of a socially and
culturally identifiable group—a united brotherhood that is solid, serene, set-
tled, and disciplined. This brotherhood, of course, is the Communist Party as
it sought to celebrate the advent of Socialism.76
The Communists’ efforts to depict themselves as Italians—indeed, as the
best of the Italians—while striking, might not have been necessary because
Italian Communists in postwar Italy truly were Italian. They had the same
cultural background, the same popular traditions, the same customs, hopes,
morality, prejudices, and behaviors, and often the same religious outlook as
other Italians. Whatever might be asserted, Italian Communists and Catholics
were one people. As the anthropological work of Liliana Lanzardo has con-
firmed, the typical citizen in the Communist stronghold of Borgo San Paolo
(Turin) was monogamous, hard-working, unselfish, prudent, diligent, mod-
erate, generous, bashful, and shy of hanging out at the traditional wine bars
(osteria). These Italians might have been radical in their politics, but their
lifestyle was perfectly bourgeois.77
Other anthropological research and historical reconstructions—on differ-
ent regions and towns, in periods from the late 1940s to the 1980s—point in
the same direction.78 True, the realm of propaganda and ideology seemed torn
apart by irreconcilable antithesis and by fierce and brutal contrasts. Yet, the
Communists were depicted as a world upside down. See, for example, the propaganda film Accadde a
sopradisotto, DC, 12 min., 1951, in AADC.
76. One can glimpse the party, while it awaits the coming of Socialism and in the meantime com-
mits to the work it has yet to do, in Uno sciopero a rovescio [Reserved strike], PCI, 3 min., 1951, in
AAMOD. In this rough piece of film shot in the Frusinate (a few miles south of Rome), a community
of villagers defy government authority and build a desperately needed road with pickaxes and shovels
during a holiday.
77. Lanzardo, Personalità operaia e coscienza di classe. See also Giovanni De Luna, “A Torino durante
la guerra . . . Le coordinate dell’esistenza collettiva,” in Anna Bravo, ed., Donne e uomini nelle guerra
mondiali (Turin: Laterza, 2008), esp. pp. 76–77. In the same area, for the interwar years, see “Cultura
operaia e vita quotidiana in Borgo San Paolo,” in Giovanni Bertolo, ed., Torino tra le due Guerre, exh.
cat. (Turin: Musei Civici, 1978), pp. 2–45, 272–279.
78. Liliano Faenza, Cattolici e comunisti in una parrocchia di campagna (Feltrinelli, Italy: Milano,
1959); David I. Kertzer, Comrades and Christian: Religion and Political Struggle in Communist Italy
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Caroline White, Patrons and Partisans: A Study of
Politics in Two Southern Italian Comuni (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Luciano
Li Causi, Il partito a noi ci ha dato! Antropologia politica di una sezione comunista senese nel dopoguerra
(Siena, Italy: Laboratorio Etnoantropologico, 1993); and Sandro Bellassai, La morale comunista: Pub-
blico e privato nella rappresentazione del PCI 1947–1957 (Rome: Carocci, 2000).
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realities of private life, personal behavior, and individual choice suggest the
existence of a “gray” area in which the intense ideological hues faded away.
Catholic and traditional moral values were deeply rooted and flourished in
the whole fabric of Italian society and thus also among PCI members. Com-
munists might have been—and in fact claimed to be—anti-clerical and hostile
to the Vatican’s financial and political structure, but many professed Catholi-
cism or Christian beliefs and followed religious rituals and practices such as
baptism for their children. Both within the PCI and across the entirety of Ital-
ian popular culture, the political myth of Christ as revolutionary and as “the
First Socialist” was strong—a myth propagated at the end of the nineteenth
century by the socialist “preacher” Camillo Prampolini (1859–1930), founder
of “evangelical socialism.”79
With few exceptions—exceptions confined to a narrow circle of leaders
and “progressive” and revolutionary intellectuals—Communists’ attitudes to-
ward family, sexuality, marriage, and the role of the individual in society were
hardly distinguishable from the attitudes of their Catholic counterparts.80
Both Catholics and Communists feared the most disturbing and unsettling
effects of modernity and social, economic, and cultural modernization. In
a letter sent to the PCI weekly publication Vie nuove, a militant anxiously
wrote, “We have heard that in the country of Socialism [i.e., the Soviet Union]
women do traditional and typical male jobs such as ship captains, miners, etc.
Don’t you think this is pushing too far the project of equality between woman
and man?”81 The presumed superiority of men over women was barely dis-
cussed by Italian Communists. Women could be considered “mere objects” or
“sheer instruments of pleasure,” as one Italian Communist wrote in his 1951
autobiography.82 Another militant naively confessed that he did not believe
79. One of Prampolini’s best-known speeches is the so-called Christmas speech. Camillo Prampolini,
“La predica di Natale,” La Giustizia, 24–25 December 1897. See also Stefano Pivato, Clericalismo e
laicismo nella cultura popolare italiana (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1990), pp. 66–119; Arnaldo Nesti, “Gesù
socialista”: Una tradizione popolare italiana (Turin: Ed. Claudiana, 1974); and Boarelli, La fabbrica del
passato, pp. 54–60.
80. Maria Casalini, Famiglie comuniste. Ideologia e vita quotidiana nell’Italia degli anni Cinquanta
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010); and Bellassai, La morale comunista, pp. 115–200.
81. “Donne socialiste e lavori pesanti,” Vie nuove risponde (Rome: Editoriale Vie Nuove, 1953), p.
212. On Communists and gender identity and the relationship between genders in Cold War Italy,
see Bellassai, La morale comunista, pp. 201–319.
82. Autobiography no. 155, in Fondazione Istituto Gramsci Emilia Romagna, Autobiografie dei mil-
itanti del Partito Comunista Italiano di Bologna e provincia, 1945–1958. The Communist press de-
nounced the bleak and backward condition of women not only in the south but also in the “ad-
vanced” and “Red” countryside of Emilia. See Domenico Rea, “La donna salva,” Noi donne, No. 46
(19 November 1950), p. 5; Felice Chilanti, “Il primo amore delle fanciulle del Sud,” Noi donne, No.
27 (4 July 1954), p. 7; and Giuliana Dal Pozzo, “Le donne che non siedono a tavola,” Noi donne,
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in what he himself proclaimed in his role as a party propagandist and activist
when affirming that men and women must have equal rights.83
The undeniable reality of the Italian-ness of Communist Party members,
and the need to demonize former allies in the battle against Fascism, prompted
Christian Democrats, Catholics, and other anti-Communist forces to manu-
facture new imagery. The stereotype of the unknown barbarian descending
from Eastern wastelands no longer sufficed. The new challenge was how one
could go about presenting Communism as an alien threat to Italy when PCI
members were so well integrated into the Italian way of life.
The propaganda film La strategia della menzogna (The Strategy of
the Lie)—produced by the Civic Committees in the run-up to the 1948
elections—broke new ground in the burgeoning anti-Communist cam-
paign.84 Instead of relying on stereotypes that portrayed Communists as
barbarous outsiders, the new strategy presented Communist leaders as fast-
talking demagogues bent on manipulating the “credulous” masses. These lead-
ers, as shown in the film, engage in manipulation by contrasting the misery of
the people with the opulence of capitalists. A predictable sequence of events
ensues. First the worker obeys the Communists and goes out on strike; then
the local economy becomes paralyzed; and finally turmoil and civil strife de-
scend on the city. At the end of the film, the narrator observes how the crowds
at Communist meetings are “eternally deceived,” and he draws a not-so-subtle
comparison between the Fascist supporters of Mussolini and the followers of
the PCI’s Palmiro Togliatti.
The comparison between Communism and Fascism, and the portrayal of
Communists as easily manipulated dupes gained popularity in postwar Italy.85
Contributing to this set-up was the writer Giovanni Guareschi, who produced
No. 4 (23 January 1955), p. 6. In letters sent to Communist journals and publications, women of-
ten complained about their “Red” husbands, who allegedly were “extremely jealous” and “possessive,”
“selfish” like a capitalist, and petty-minded. Communist men were also accused of treating their wives
as “scapegoats” for their problems and of thinking that the ideal wife was one to be kept in a constant
state of subjugation, both physical and intellectual. See Giuliana Dal Pozzo, “Mio marito sarebbe
l’ideale se . . .” Noi donne, No. 46 (21 November 1954), pp. 16–17; Antonietta, “Signora Maria, ha
cinque minuti di tempo? Al marito della signora Maria . . . ,” Noi donne, No. 10 (7 March 1954), p. 3;
and “Confidatevi con Paola, incomprensione maschile,” Vie nuove, No. 33 (23 August 1953), p. 24.
83. See Boarelli, La fabbrica del passato, pp. 168–169.
84. La strategia della menzogna, Comitato Civico Nazionale, 9.5 min., 1948, in Fondazione Ugo Spir-
ito, Archivio Storico, Fondo Comitati Civici, No. 4.
85. The overlap between Nazism (and Fascism) and Communism and the link between them un-
der the usefully elastic term “totalitarianism” or the label of “Red Fascism” was common to anti-
Communist propaganda everywhere. See Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The
Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the America Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s,”
American Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 4 (April 1970), pp. 1046–1064.
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Giovanni Guareschi, Blind, Willing, and Absolute Obedience (1948). The cap-
tion reads: “Countermand that, men! The sentence published in l’Unità: ‘The
comrades who do not fly are traitors,’ should be really read: ‘The comrades
who do not vote are traitors.’ ” [N.B.: Fly – Vote in Italian are Volano – Votano].
From: Candido, 7 March 1948. Image Courtesy of Archivio Giovannino
Guareschi, Roncole Verdi (PR). © Eredi di Giovannino Guareschi.
a steady stream of anti-Communist cartoons for the weekly periodical Can-
dido.86 Guareschi’s cartoons range in artistic style from mere doodles to more
detailed drawings, but consistently his humor is sharp and direct. On some
occasions, PCI members are portrayed as three-breasted women. More typical
is his depiction of the Communist as a goofy-looking fellow with three nos-
trils.87 The third nostril, as Guareschi explained, was the indispensable prereq-
uisite for Communist militancy, for it allowed gray matter to ooze out of the
brain, and simultaneously it provided party rhetoric with a gate of entrance.88
In a similar vein, the young Federico Fellini—not yet the director
of film masterpieces such as Otto e mezzo (8½, 1963) and La dolce vita
(1960)—produced many satirical cartoons in the immediate aftermath of
the war. In his popular series I due compagni (The Two Comrades), Fellini’s
86. From 1946 to 1960 Guareschi wrote hundreds of short stories set in a small, remote town where
Catholics and Communists and their leaders—the Catholic priest don Camillo and the Communist
mayor Peppone (which roughly translates as “Big Joe”)—are constantly at odds. The stories were turned
into popular films. See Giovanni Guareschi, Mondo Piccolo: Don Camillo (Milan: Rizzoli, 1948); Gio-
vanni Guareschi, Mondo Piccolo: Don Camillo e il suo gregge (Milan: Rizzoli, 1953); and Giovanni
Guareschi, Mondo Piccolo: Il compagno Don Camillo (Milan: Rizzoli 1963). The first movie was Don
Camillo (1952), directed by Julien Duvivier and included Gino Cervi (Peppone) and Fernandel (don
Camillo).
87. The word trinariciuti (three-nostriled), Guareschi’s neologism, is widely used in current Italian
language.
88. Giovanni Guareschi, Mondo Candido 1946–1948 (Milan: Rizzoli, 1991), pp. 219–220.
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Federico Fellini, The Two Comrades (1946). The caption reads:
– Comrade, she is my wife!
– Comrade, l’ Unità does not report it!
– Comrade, you are right: I am very sorry and hurrah to Togliatti!
Source: Angelo Olivieri, Fellini Satyricon Politikon. Le vignette tra guerra e
partiti (Rome: Un mondo a parte, 2005), p. 66.
characters are little more than caricatures, a duo of moronic but likable buf-
foons who are completely dependent on the party press. They are incapable
of judgment even when the truth is obvious.
This kind of representation persisted even after the start of the
“Khrushchev Thaw” and the de-Stalinization campaign launched at the Twen-
tieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. A film produced by
the Christian Democrats in 1958 portrayed Communists as gullible and daft.
The title of the film, The Comrade Gnocco-Allocco, plays with language.89 Lit-
erally translated, Gnocco-Allocco means “Pasta-Bird,” but nearly every Italian
would understand that this conveys qualities of naïveté, stupidity, or just plain
folly. Thus, to the typical viewer, “Comrade Gnocco-Allocco” would mean
something akin to “Comrade Silly-Gullible-Foolish.” Not surprisingly, the
89. Il compagno Gnocco-Allocco, DC, 12 min., 1958, in AADC.
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protagonist, Signore Gnocco-Allocco, is a staunch Communist who, despite
his sincerity, is wholly lacking in wisdom, understanding, and common sense.
He is the electoral backbone of the PCI, the Italian equivalent of the “useful
idiot.”90
In the works of Fellini and Guareschi, and in the Gnocco-Allocco docu-
mentary produced by the DC, the use of humor and ridicule was a delib-
erate strategy that enabled the anti-Communists to portray their archenemy
in harsh terms, but without seeming cruel. In contrast to the United States,
where domestic Communism could be cast as wholly alien and un-American,
the Italian situation was very different.91 In a country in which as many as
one-third of the electorate—more than 8 million Italians in 1948—had cast
their votes with the Popular Front, a thorough demonization was untenable.
Just as untenable were the plans elaborated by the U.S. Psychological Strat-
egy Board (established in 1951), which called for the Italian government (and
the French) to undertake a series of measures aimed at “reducing the strength
and the appeal” of Communists with the “ultimate objective of outlawing
them.”92 Also untenable was the heated anti-Communist rhetoric offered by
U.S. Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce in her attempt to remake the Italian po-
litical landscape.93 By contrast, ridicule and humor enabled anti-Communists,
Catholics, and Christian Democrats to dismiss Communists politically, while
still recognizing their humanity.94 To do otherwise would almost certainly
have created an insurmountable discord within households, neighborhoods,
and communes throughout Italy. Ridicule thus served as a social balm that
mitigated the friction between clashing but constituent parts of Italy’s body
politic.
90. The idea that Communism, like every ideological system, deprives people of individuality and
robs them of their self-respect is conveyed in films of the early Cold War such as Man on a Tightrope,
directed in 1953 by Elia Kazan.
91. Ellen Schrecker, “McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of Communism,” Social Re-
search, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 1041–1086; and Richard M. Fried, The Russians Are Coming!
The Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America (Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni-
versity Press). On the Western—mainly U.S.—construction of enemy stereotypes, based on a mixture
of popular psychology, advertising technique, and academic research, see Ron Robin, The Making of
the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Industrial Complex (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2001).
92. “French and Italian Elections,” 6 July 1951, in HSTL, Staff Member and Office File, Psychological
Strategy Board File, Box 11, Folder 091.4; and “Remarks by the Department of State Member of the
Psychological Strategy Board on the Psychological Strategy Plan for Reduction of Communist Power
in Italy,” 2 February 1952, in NARA, RG 59, 62D333, Box 1, File PSB D-15.
93. Mario Del Pero, “American Pressures and Their Containment in Italy during the Ambassadorship
of Clare Boothe Lice, 1953–1956,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 3 (June 2004), pp. 407–439.
94. The strategy of humor and ridicule as a weapon in dealing with the enemy can be traced back to
the tradition of the commedia dell’arte.
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Conclusion
The Communist in Cold War Italy assumed many faces. At times he was the
enemy or the courageous resistance fighter. On other occasions he was the
three-nostril caricature. Sometimes he even represented the “best” among
Italians. For all their differences, these competing representations sought to
answer the same question haunting postwar Italy: How were Italians to make
sense of their recent past and define themselves as a culture and a people in
the present?
The search for order and the construction of a new identity, both for
individuals and for the nation as a whole, took place in almost all West Eu-
ropean countries after World War II but attained a special urgency in Italy.95
Italy was the only country west of the Balkans in which World War II became
a civil war. Italy was the only West European country in which sovereignty
was contested internally—with competing governments, supported by their
own armies, claiming legitimacy. On 25 July 1943, the Fascist regime had
collapsed as a result of heavy casualties, economic crisis, food shortages, and
the setbacks of the war. Forty-five days later, on 8 September, Marshal Pietro
Badoglio announced over the radio that an armistice with the Allies had been
signed five days earlier. Accordingly, he ordered the Italian armed forces to
cease fighting the Allies, but he offered no other precise instructions. The an-
nouncement was followed by the precipitate flight from Rome of King Victor
Emmanuel III, his family, and the military high command.
In the wake of the king’s ignominious exit, a void emerged in the
leadership of Italy, as soldiers and civilians were left without clear military
and political direction. Within days an army of more than a million men
disintegrated, and hundreds of thousands of troops were rounded up by Ger-
mans and interned in concentration camps.96 As the Anglo-American armies
advanced from southern Italy into the German-occupied north, civil war
broke out between the forces of Resistance and the forces of Fascism. From
this condition emerged a situation of unprecedented uncertainty. The propa-
gation of warfare into society pitted neighbor against neighbor and uprooted
customary life through violence, material devastation, massacres, retaliation,
95. On the theme of Italian national identity in the immediate aftermath of World War II, see Emilio
Gentile, La Grande Italia: The Myth of the Nation in the Twentieth Century (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 2009), pp. 211–335; Ernesto Galli della Loggia, La morte della patria: La crisi dell’idea
di nazione tra antifascismo, Resistenza e Repubblica (Rome-Bari, Italy: Laterza, 2003); and Gian Enrico
Rusconi, Resistenza e postfascismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995).
96. Elena Aga-Rossi, A Nation Collapses: The Italian Surrender of September 1943, trans. by Harvey
Ferguson II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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and bombing. Torn by these pressures, the legal framework of the nation
evaporated. Civilian life became a frontline experience, destroying patterns
of trust and social consensus and undermining faith in elites and political au-
thority. For almost everyone in Italy, the war produced great confusion and
disorientation.97
The construction of an ideological framework of authority through the
images of Communism helped assuage deep uncertainty about the political
and economic situation and the potentially disruptive consequences of the
civil war. From the perspective of the average Italian citizen, the paramount
threat to the nation was neither a violent Communist takeover nor a Fas-
cist return to power. More than anything, Italians yearned for stability.98 For
Communists and anti-Communists alike, images of Communism armed an
anxious population with the symbols and markers of certainty. For the sup-
porters of the PCI, the image of the self-sacrificing Communist militant pro-
vided Italians with the assurance that, despite obstacles, they could ultimately
prevail. By contrast, for anti-Communists, Catholics, Christian Democrats,
and other conservative forces, the image of the Communist barbarian who
threatened the very existence of freedom, religion, and superior civilization
offered patriotic Italians a sense of clarity by providing a coherent vision of
the battles to be fought and the enemies to be overcome.
During the civil war, Communists, Catholics, and some conservative
forces fought arm- in-arm against Fascism. Identity was taken for granted.
One was either Fascist or anti-Fascist, and as a consequence it did not mat-
ter much whether a person identified as a “Communist” or a “Catholic”
or a “Christian Democrat.” Because the battle lines were clear (at least in
retrospect), neither Communists nor Conservatives nor Catholic partisans
needed to think hard about the nature of their cause. With the eventual
demise of Fascism and the end of the war, however, Communists and anti-
Communists confronted a very different situation. They needed to offer a plan
97. For testimonies, memories, and historical reconstructions, see Enrico Emanuelli, Teatro person-
ale (Milan: Muggiani, 1945), pp. 55–56; Gabriella Gribaudi, Guerra totale: Tra bombe alleate e vi-
olente naziste: Napoli e fronte meridionale 1940–1944 (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2005), 311–328;
Giulio Guderzo, L’altra guerra: Neofascisti, tedeschi, partigiani, popolo in una provincia padana: Pavia,
1943–1945 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002), pp. 1–80; and Rosario Forlenza, “Bewilderment and Re-
composition: September 8, 1943 and the Liminal Origins of Italian Democracy,” International Politi-
cal Anthropology, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2011), pp. 133–157.
98. The Italian desire for stability after years of turmoil, and yet also for renewal, and the ability of
Christian Democrats to meet and cherish the hopes and fears of Italians are powerfully assessed in
Ennio Di Nolfo, Le paure e le speranze degli italiani, 1943–1953 (Milan: Mondadori, 1986). See also
Rosario Forlenza, “A Party for the Mezzogiorno: The Christian Democratic Party, Agrarian Reform,
and the Government of Italy,” Contemporary European History, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2010), pp. 331–349.
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for stability that was simultaneously compatible with their earlier ideological
commitments. Thus, two opposite stereotypes came to occupy the symbolic
worldview of Italians: that of Communists as a menace to Italian values; and,
conversely, that of Communists as selfless promulgators of a new, stable order
rooted in social justice. For both images the opponent was indispensable to
achieving full identity—an identity whose coalescence had been stalled when
the anti-Fascist alliance against the common enemy had broken apart. Each
party needed the other to serve as a straw man—or as an oppositional marker
of certainty around which its own identity could be constructed.
In the late 1940s and the 1950s, depictions of Communists reflected a
Manichaean conflict between good and evil.99 From the political left, Com-
munists portrayed their enemies as champions of the oppressive hydra of
capitalism, Fascism, and clericalism. From the standpoint of the Christian
Democrats and Catholics, as well as other anti-Communists, the enemy
wanted an all-out assault on religion, private property, and the family. In
this propaganda war, both the enemies of the Communists and the Commu-
nists themselves employed a visual grammar deeply rooted in Italians’ cultural
memory and expressed through centuries in folk and religious art. At a time
when the old markers of certainty had dissolved and the durability of the Ital-
ian polity seemed tenuous, images of Communism—a synthesis of old and
new—provided reassurance. By invoking tacit knowledge and using familiar
symbols, these new images helped to craft a new narrative that made sense
of the turbulent world Italians were confronting and, more importantly, pro-
vided a road map that would enable them to escape their tragic history and
enter a new world.
The representations and case studies analyzed in this article are meant to
highlight the unique and compelling character of the political, cultural, and
symbolic battle over Communism that was waged in postwar Italy. The discus-
sion here helps to explain why the Cold War in Italy was so peculiarly intense
and why the basic split engendered by Stalinism had such a remarkable per-
sistence. Communists and anti-Communists alike forged an image of Com-
munism as a political entity. This representation, however, incorporated stark
images, the pre-political repertoire of recurrent archetypical symbols, the lexi-
con of civil war language, and the legacy of Fascist mentality and propaganda.
Symbolic, mythical, and cultural elements from various sources were fused
99. For the “spiritual” dimension of the Cold War, see Abbot Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner
History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 72–88; Stephen Rossbach,
Gnostic Wars: The Cold War in the Context of a History of Western Spirituality (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1999).
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with contemporary political ideology to create a special visual language and
appealing rhetoric to facilitate the seizure of power, the seizure of meaning, the
transformation of popular attitudes and beliefs toward elite and political au-
thority, the reconstruction of patterns of trust and social consensus, the redefi-
nition of social values, and the creation of a new mystique. In a formative and
transformative moment for the political imagination of Italians—when the
civil war had challenged old ways of comprehending the world and aroused
profound uncertainty over the meaning of the past, present, and future—
symbols, languages, rituals, and visual imagery introduced by Communists
and anti-Communists infused the political community with new meanings,
cast new meaning on the experience undergone by individuals and groups,
affected people’s worldviews, and fostered the formation of bloc identities.
Thus, even when traditional Cold War culture and international conflicts
were losing their grasp and agency, a political imagination centered on the
opposition between Communism and anti-Communism exerted a visible in-
fluence and was preserved in Italian political culture long after that opposition
had become obsolete. The depiction of Communism in postwar Italy was not
an adjunct to diplomacy or political and military affairs but a critical deter-
minant of the Cold War, a paramount factor in shaping the meaning of the
conflict and the deep character of Italian politics and culture until the opening
of the Berlin Wall and well beyond.
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